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ESSAYS AND BOOK REVIEWS
STUDIES IN ISRAEL LAW. By Guido Tedeschi.
(Hebrew University Legal Studies No. 7), Jerusalem: Hebrew University Students'
Press, 1960.

This volume is a collection of papers by a much honored member of
the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The material deals with problems involved in the pull and haul of creating an
Israeli legal system for Israeli society. Approximately half of the book
deals with law more or less in general, while the balance concentrates
more closely on specific problems of contemporary Israel. There are
eight chapters in all. The first chapter is a proposal for an inductive
study of law; the second deals with the position of legislation in modern
private law; the third and fourth chapters examine approaches to legislation for the still quite new Israel, with special attention focused on the
problems presented by her present period of transition and the uncertainness of her future. In these chapters the problems involved in communication between draftsmen and legislators, and legislators and the society
for which they legislate, are examined and proposals are offered. In the
fifth chapter, Professor Tedeschi reviews the movement toward westernization and codification in neighboring states that, like Israel, have roots
in the Ottoman Empire (e.g., Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon). The sixth
chapter exanines the principle of stare decisis and the different uses to
which it is put and its adaptability to a positivistic system. The last two
chapters are devoted to the study of problems peculiar to Israel, such as
its development out of a British Mandate territory, and its religious foundations and their involvement in the generally accepted legal notions. To
the extent that the book as a whole can be said to support a thesis, it
seems to be that Israel, and probably everyone else, needs a generalized
statement of abstract principles that can be enacted by a theoretically
omnipotent legislator and applied by its obedient servants, the courts, to
any and all cases without undue grumbling from the people who are being
legislated for. The division of jurisdiction implicit in the statement that
"the legislator enables the citizen to participate in the lawmaking process,"
in those cases where there is no indefeasible legislative rule, is one to
which this reader cannot wholeheartedly subscribe.
In his first chapter, Professor Tedeschi examines the problems of
the inefficacy of law and the tendency of a society to construct for itself
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non-legal institutions for the regulation of conduct, without regard for
parallel institutions that are made available by law for the same purpose.
He also examines cases where the legislator has apparently desired that
no firmness of law develop.' The case is persuasively put for a science
of law that will serve in legal work as a science of entomology serves in
dealing with insects. In addition to the body of normative rules that is
law, we need a descriptive science that will enable us to learn about law
and how it works; what is its social impact, wherein is it not doing what
we have believed it was doing, and does it have effects of which we have
no inkling. Current research into law and the behavioral sciences would
seem to be the sort of thing that Professor Tedeschi would approve as
furtherance of his inductive science of law. An exception is that much
of the current work seems to be in terms of a law that "is" only as it
effects behavior.2 Professor Tedeschi's position, repeated throughout
the book, indicates a belief in law defined primarily in terms of legislative
pronouncement. He wants the same sort of information as do contemporary realists, but he will find from it not what the law is, but whether
it is being evaded or violated; or whether gaps have been found and supplied in the practice of the community which call for legislated rules.
Though he suggests that legal norms may be enacted by a legislature, created by judges or spontaneously produced by society, it is clear
that Professor Tedeschi prefers to limit law to legislated norms that may
either require or permit action by members of a society. If this narrower view of law is to be adopted, the descriptive science that is needed
will have to be much broader than a mere science of law; it will need
within its reach the full range of normative controls to which the society
is subject, whether they have legislative sanction or not. Professor Tedeschi points out in the chapter that although such study will require the
assistance of statisticians, economists, and sociologists, it is still lawyers'
work. To this reader, it seem unnecessary that the work be begun with
an attitude of law reform. It is better, perhaps, to see what we currently
have in the way of law before we set out to reform it. If the study that
is proposed does what is clearly envisaged for it, the sentiment for reform
will grow quite naturally from the work, assuming, of course, that re1. The negative provisions of legislation to which continental authors are apt to
refer are not as numerous with us in the common law. The principal place where such
negative provisions are found in our law is in the field of constitutional law; especially
with regard to the relation between departments of government. When such provisions
appear, they are usually the result of a finding of judges, the legislator having omitted
to speak. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2. As a recent example of law and behavioral science study, see Mentschikoff,

Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1961).
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form is necessary. Unless one defines law broadly to include all the influences in society that are directive of conduct as did Duguit, it is not
clear why this social research is an inductive study of law.
No legal system will ever be completely legislative, but the relationship existing between statute and judge-made law is viewed quite differently in different systems. Professor Tedeschi, trained in the civil
law, is dealing with a residuum of law derived from the Ottoman Empire,
British Mandate and, more recently, legislation of the Knesset. He is
discussing a common law which, under the mandate of the Palestine
Order in Council of 1922, is as spotty as the Roman Common Law decreed for Germany by Emperor Maximillian. He sees the judge-made
law as a filler of lacunae. On the other hand, an Anglo-American common lawyer is more apt to think of judge-made law as the great mass,
with legislation filling lacunae or making the adjustments required by
unanticipated shifts in social, political and economic relations. The fact
that "juristic law" came first in the history of law, and legislation only
thereafter," may be a reason for the present state of Anglo-American law.
'We have not suffered the frustrating diversity or the violent social revolutions of Europe, and have not, therefore, had occasion for as much
legislated change as have some countries. As a result, our law has a
smaller portion of enacted rules. It is not clear that because of this deficiency, our law is more primitive, unless one accepts the proposition put
forth by Maine5 that the ultimate in legal development is a second stage
of codification. The examples given in the first chapter of the schemes
being used to circumvent the rules of strict law' would indicate that Israel
is still well within the bounds of the stage at which fiction is operating as
a modifier of the traditional law. The incorporation of miri lands' seems
to be the use of the Uetitat and quo minus to gain remedies otherwise unavailable. The fact that the rule being evaded are legislative rules of a
recent period, rather than traditional rules of long standing, would seem
to indicate only that the society is at present unprepared for further rigidification. If they are ancient rules of the traditional law, and even if they
are written in authoritative texts, they are perhaps better left to be transmuted by the people and the courts into rules reflecting the contemporary
thought of the community rather than laid down in some new and rigid
3.

4.
Maine,
juristic
5.
6.
7.

Duguit, Objective Law, 21 COLUm. L. REv. 17 (1921).

And this is not the case unless one discounts the suggestions by Savigny and
on both of whom Professor Tedeschi relies, that a stage of codification preceded
law.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, ch. 2 (1931).
TEDESCHI, STUDIES IN ISRAEL LAW 7-8 (1960).
Id. at 5.
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legislative text. If the legislator is "democratic," as Professor Tedeschi
asserts (especially as opposed to the courts and lawyers), he can fairly
be expected to want to enact a rule that is desired by the people for
whom he legislates.
The conflict between conservative rules of law, which always follow
a bit behind practice, and law enacted by the legislator, which tends to'
direct uncertain or even reluctant practice, is sharply drawn by Professor
Tedeschi in his chapter "Private Law and Legislation Today." Though
one cannot doubt that the sphere of legislative and administrative rule is
growing at a frightful pace, the suggestion that this growth is evidence
that the body of private law cannot properly be left to be shaped by judicial processes is not convincing to one trained in a common law system.
The slower moving body of law so easily called reactionary lends reliability to the expectations of law demanded by a society. A measure of
reliability in law is essential if we are to have a legal order rather than
a series of arbitrary fiats, whether these fiats be judicial or legislative.
This is recognized even by authors who are concerned with combating
notions of a rigid doctrine of binding rules.' Where court-made rules
prove not to meet the needs of a community, the legislature will be called
upon for departures of a more radical nature than is appropriate for
judge-made law. Furthermore, it is not only within the common law
that we find concern with custom as a source of law:
Writers of the nineteenth century had a tendency to deny that
custom was a source of civil law. . . . In reality, custom is an
important source of civil law. One may even discern two
forms: Custom properly so-called, of popular origin, which is
the practice followed by the generality of people, and custom of
learned origin . . . evolved by jurists (perhaps with the implicit approval of the generality of people), but to which time, in
any case, has given a patina.'
It does not seem useful at this point to explore the question of the Roman
varieties of custom. Though we might well ask why modem Israel or
any other contemporary state should be governed by the distinctions
drawn in a legal system that has been officially dead for nearly fifteen
hundred years, we may note that "precedent, though unrecognized in the
lawyers' lists of sources, is well enough known . . .to the rhetoricians,
8. "The law is not properly susceptible to whim or caprice. It must have the
sturdy qualities required of every framework that is designed for substantial structures.
Moreover, it must have uniformity when applied to the daily affairs of men." Douglas,
Stare Decisis, 49 ComLM. L. REv. 735 (1949).

9.

1 CARPONNIER,

DROIT

CivIL 96-97 (1955).
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and undoubtedly played some part in the development of the law. Judgments might even be read in court, at any rate in [Roman] Egypt..... .10
The full impact of the social legislation so popular today is rarely,
if ever, foreseen by the legislator. A statute regulating milk prices, for
example, can be expected to have legal impact on existing as well as future contracts. These problems are as numerous and individualized as
are the contracts involved. The effect of a statute or regulation will
necessarily be worked out in a judicial forum, no matter what the legislator prescribes. It is not clear why this obvious and necessary process
is acceptable when the legislator has laid down impinging norms, but is
undesirable where the norms are the outgrowth of social and commercial
practice as distilled in judicial statements. The judge-made norms are
not statements of lawyers' opinions; they are statements of lawyers' conclusions about the practices of segments of society as they are represented
in litigation." The views thus crystallized do not constitute an ideology
of the whole community. Legal rules taken in significant bundles are
not only unlikely to constitute an ideology, but are unlikely even to be
thought of by those members of the society on whose activities they are
not at the moment impinging. It is fiction to say that a whole community has accepted or is willing to accept a rule as ideology just because
a parliament rather than a court has laid down the rule. Legal rules
generally do not achieve effectiveness by being clothed with ideological
acceptability, although they may become so clothed because of a habit of
obedience. 2 If the legislated norm diverges far enough from practice,
as opposed to ideology, the habit will necessarily be overcome.
Professor Tedeschi well reminds us that, faced with a tyrannical
legislature, juridical science is not an effective safeguard for society.
This is so even though, as Dean Pound has indicated, courts have found
five heads under which limitations upon legislative power can be effected
by them.' 3 Professor Tedeschi has no sympathy with any such limitations. This reader concurs in Lord Radcliffe's belief "that the ordinary
10. JOLoWiCZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF Ro1xA LAW 569 (1952).
See also C. K. AlU.E, LAw IN THE MAING 159-60 (6th ed. 1958).
11. It is noteworthy that a recent writer on the sources of the civil law found it
appropriate to discuss la coutume d'orighie savante, and that he distinguished it from
custom in the ordinary sense (popular custom) in that it is not produced by a practice
of the people at large. 1 CARBONNIER, DROIT CiviL 96 (1955).
12. AuSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENcE DETERMINED, lecture 6 (1954).
13. The five heads: (1) conflict of legislation with natural law; (2) interference
of a temporal legislator in spiritual affairs; (3) attempts of Parliament to derogate
from the royal prerogative prior to the Bill of Rights; (4) conflict of legislation with
rules of international law; and (5) friction between the terms of a statute and the doctrines or principles of the common law. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv.
L. REV. 383 (1908).
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citizen would be both surprised and dismayed to have it brought home to
him that his legal system was, theoretically, at the mercy of [the legislative] assembly and could be radically remodeled by it, as it were, overnight."' 4 Even with the doctrine of restrictive interpretation of statutes,"5
a court is no match for a legislature when it comes to tyranny. The
suspicion of legitimate legislative activity that is behind the tendency to
restrict legislation to its smallest possible ambit is unfortunate. A stated
doctrine of restrictive interpretation is not the evil, however. This writer
agrees with Professor Tedeschi to the extent that when a legislator
enacts the "abolition of constructive malice,"' 6 it is not desirable for
judges to put malice constituted by a proved intention to inflict grievous
bodily harm back into the law of murder;" and this is so even if they
can find language upon which, in continental manner, they can hang their
decision.' One might ask, however, why relations between individuals
before the court should be governed by a law unless the legislator has
used the language at his disposal to clearly cover the case, especially if
the rule has been pronounced since the parties fixed their own positions
in reliance on established earlier practice. It does not take an Aristotle
to see that the legislator cannot have had in mind the multitude of individual relations that may be effected by their efforts. 9
The case for reading legislation "broadly" is no stronger than that
for reading it "narrowly"-and neither aim is the business of the court,
which has the single task of deciding the case before it. It is for this
purpose that the law, whether legislative, judicial or other, must be taken
to mean something:
A statute is the expressed will of the legislative organ of a society; but until the dealers in psychic forces succeed in making
of thought transference a working controllable force (and the
psychic transference of the thought of an artificial body must
14. RADCLIFFE, THE LAW & ITS COMPASS 11 (1960).
15. This well-known doctrine has a steadily diminishing following. The influence

of a number of influential jurists has helped to reduce its effect. See CARozo, THE
PARADOXES OF LEGAL ScrEcE 10 (1928) ; 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENcE 669-70 (1959). However, danger of encroachment by the judiciary on legislative authority is not new to
American history by any means. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81.
16. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, C. 11, § 1.

17. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, 3 WEELY L.R. 546 (1960).
18. Given "where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other
offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not
done in the course or furtherance of another offense," the court turned its decision in
the Smith case, supra note 17, on a reference to "the words in parentheses."
19. See Learned Hand's discussion of ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICHOMACHEA V 1137,
lines 12-28, and ARISTOTLE, RHETORICA I 1373, lines 18-40. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS

21-25 (1958).
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stagger the most advanced of the ghost hunters), the will of
the legislature has to be expressed by words, spoken or written;
that is, by causing sounds to be made, or by causing black marks
to be impressed on white paper. .

.

. [F] rom this impression

[the judge] has to reproduce the thought of the law-giving
body. The process is far from being merely mechanical; it is
obvious how the character of the judge and the cast of his
mind must affect the operation ....

As between the legislative

and judicial organs of the society, it is the judicial which has
the last say as to what is and what is not Law in a community.2"
If the case is not one in which relations between the parties depend upon
the meaning of the words, but one where relations depend on policy statements from the legislature, such policy is still going to be a product of
judicial opinion unless the legislature has been extraordinarily explicit
or takes unto itself the task of deciding cases.
The difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is
raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges
have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean
on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it
would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the
point had been present.2
How, indeed, are we to find a policy when legislators shift from one
policy to another in the course of the same legislative session or even the
same enactment. 2 Even with the improvements expected to accrue from
adoption of Professor Tedeschi's proposals for preparation of legislation, it is unwise to expect miracles.
It is doubtful that a "real philosophy [to] determine the fundamentals of good and evil for individual and society" is attainable with
any greater unanimity than is our present set of specific rules that are
tied to assortments of fact situations. What appears to be sought is an
articulation of a social ideology. However, since society does not speak
for itself and there is no particularly impressive reason why a judge's
plilosophy or one arrived at by parliamentary compromise would be
useful were it to be exposed to view, the suggestion is not satisfying.
This writer cannot join Professor Tedeschi and Goethe in the sentiment
that disorder is more pernicious than injustice. Disorder, like order, is
20. GRAY, THE NATURE ANY) SOURCES OF
21. Gray, op. cit. supra at 173.
22. 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 670 (1959).

LAw

170-72 (2d ed. 1927).
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pernicious only if unjust; and to the extent that it leaves individuals free
to order their own destinies, it is less inclined to be pernicious than is the
perfectly ordered system of imposed commands.
If unification of law is sought, as in Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century, legislation is the only efficient means. There has been
a good deal of talk in the past forty years of unification of private law
generally. If that goal is to be achieved legislation on an international
scale is a necessity. The case for unification, however, other than with
regard to commercial law and rules of private international law, is not
strong. The bulk of private law best serves a society if it is cut and
stitched to order. A suit of clothes tailored so that it will fit both father
and sons may, indeed, be a beautiful example of the art of compromise;
it will not, as tailoring, be very satisfactory to any one of them.
If we look to the peculiar situation in which Israel finds herself today, we do find some need for a form of unification. Her people have
come from all over the world, and they represent an almost infinite diversity of local custom. On the other hand, among immigrants to Israel
one finds a basic unifying element in the Hebraic tradition. To the extent there is diversity among her citizenry, it would seem to be desirable
that the rules ultimately worked out depend not on who succeeds in being
elected to the Knesset but rather which rules succeed in surviving. This,
it is submitted, will have to be the result of a so-called "common law development." Unlike many of her neighbors who are also survivors of
the Ottoman Empire, Israel has not inherited a tradition of decree law or
of codification. She has not had the influence of the French tradition,
as has Egypt; she has not had the need and desire for the sudden westernization that led Republican Turkey to adopt the German, Swiss, French
and Italian codes as a body of law. The very diversity of historical influence that Professor Tedeschi points out is a cogent reason for letting
the future legal system work its way out, rather than be simply another
historical influence imposed by fiat. It is clear that in a modern state a
good deal of legislation is required. However, in terms of the on-going
relationships of everyday law, it seems desirable for the rules to be a
product of those relationships, rather than the product of politiking in
the back rooms of a parliament.
Discussing law as a creation of judicial science, Professor Tedeschi
is led to address himself to precedent. Lawyers accustomed to a form
of stare decisis will find stimulation and much information in his examination of the great variety of positions taken on this subject by the legal
systems of the world. To an observer not accustomed to the formulae
of the civil law, however, the distinctions may appear to be rather trans-
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parent. To speak of judge-made law in a significant sense implies decisions that are binding beyond the reach of the case that provoked the
pronouncement of the rule. To say that a rule so pronounced is not
binding, because lower courts do not have to follow the rule, only leaves
us with a need for another word to replace "binding," which we will
then limit so as to make it useless in a discussion of law. Of course,
judges do not have to follow precedents, as nothing can prevent judicial
error (though it would seem that legislative error is a metaphysical impossibility). If there is no appeal or review in a legal system, there is
no binding precedent, except as discussed below with reference to courts
of last resort. In the absence of some protection against arbitrary action,
there is probably no justice either.2" Uniformity of the law is essential
to justice in a legal system and every mature system has raised some sort
of apparatus to ensure it. In England, the Divisional Courts, the Court
of Appeal and the House of Lords work at controlling the trial courts,
which bear the primary burden of applying law in every system. In the
United States, we have state and federal supreme courts and many intermediate courts of appeal. In France, there are courts of appeal and a
supreme court, the latter called the Court of Cassation. So it is all over
the world.
If there is opportunity for appeal or review and the higher court has
the power to reverse, modify or set aside the lower court's decision, there
is binding precedent. A party who has prevailed in a trial court that did
not follow a rule laid down in a higher court has not gained much if it is
subject to appeal or review. To find an absence of binding precedent in
the fact that losing parties may not have sufficient resources or the interest to prosecute an appeal or petition for review, is to build one's legal
theory upon a weak spot in the legal practice.
It is, of course, true that not all societies have evaluated the interests
involved in the same way. In the Anglo-American tradition we complain
that appeals permit litigation never to end. In other systems, such as the
French system, there is less concern that litigation be brought to a prompt
conclusion than there is that the conclusion be correct. The obtainment
of the latter is thought to be gained by exposing the case to the thought
processes of a large number of judges. In France, if a case is appealed
from a civil court to a court of appeal, the latter is supposed to set aside
so much of the judgment as is erroneous, and then enter the judgment
that ought to have been rendered in the first place. This alone, to this
writer, is proof of the existence of binding precedent in the system. The
23. Although there may be some protection in the prise c partie action against a
judge as found in the French system, such protection is difficult to conceive..
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party who has failed on the appeal may then petition the Court of Cassation to review the case of the law. If the Court of Cassation hears the
case (such review is discretionary), and finds that the court below erred
in its application or interpretation of the law, it will set aside the judgment and remand the case for rehearing. This further points out that
there is binding precedent in the system, even though the court to which
the case is remanded is not obliged to follow the Court of Cassation's
view on the law. Should it fail to do so, a further petition to the Court
of Cassation is possible and the judgment may again be reversed; if it is
reversed for the same reasons as before, the court to which it is remanded
the second time must follow the Court of Cassation. An interesting example of this system is the case of Pierre Bonnard's unsold paintings.
The case was first decided by the civil court in Paris (three judges) ; the
court of appeal of Paris (three judges) modified the judgment; the
Court of Cassation (three judges), ruling that the civil court had been
correct, set the judgment aside and remanded the case to the court of
appeal in Orlean (five judges), which decided that all three of the earlier
decisions had been wrong. The litigation had extended over a period of
seven years and this writer lost track of it at that point. However, a
further petition to the Court of Cassation, this time sitting toutes
chambres rgunies (at least thirty-five judges) is possible. Again the judgment may be reversed, and if it is reversed for the same reasons as before, the court to which it is remanded the second time must follow the
Court of Cassation. By that time the case will have been dealt with by
approximately fifty judges. There is surely going to be little doubt about
such a case should it appear in court in the future. The precedent is
binding, though the procedure is slow. 4
All of this goes only to precedent operating in the context of higher
court control of lower courts. A doctrine of stare decisis in its most
significant use implies that a court is bound by its own decisions. On
this point there is a divergence of practice that is easily discernible as we
look to the courts. The line of difference is not, however, a line between
common law and civil law courts. As is well known, the House of Lords
considers itself absolutely bound by its own decisions. 5 Erroneous decisions can be reversed only by Parliament through legislative enact24. For a summary outline of appeal and review in French law, see Kock, Machincry of Law Administration in France, 108 U. PA. L. Rxv. 366 (1959). For an extensive
comparative discussion of the French court system, see Dainow, The Constitutional and
Judicial Organization of France and Germany and Some Comparisons of the Civil Law
and Common Law Systems, 37 IND. L.J. 1 (1962).
25. See Great Western Railway Co. v. Owners of S.S. Mostyn [1928] A.C. 57, 63.
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Though under modem practice one must concede that it does

not work very well, the idea is not unsound. In theory, it is not only the
House of Lords that decides the cases, but also the Parliament; and it is
Parliament that can then overrule them. Thus we have the same body
both making and changing the rules, a procedure not unusual in the
United States and in a number of other countries. In practice there is
difficulty because legislative correction of judicial errors is often difficult to effect."
Short of legislative repeal, there is the opportunity to
distinguish, but that too has been disapproved."8 The Court of Criminal
Appeal was until 1960 the court of last resort for even the most serious
criminal cases."3 That court has taken the position that the doctrine of
stare decisis is not applicable in criminal cases, "where the liberty of the
subject is involved." 3 This ruling has been disapproved by commentators." The Privy Council, the court of last resort for the Palestine
Mandate, though it is in law a judicial body, maintains the practice one
might expect of a body related as it is to the legal system. It is a privy
council, and its duty is to make a report or recommendation to the Queen
in Council who then renders an order, as it were, ex gratia.32 The council
does not consider itself bound by its previous reports and recommendations. 3
In the United States, though some state supreme courts are more
reluctant than others to change rules they themselves have laid down,
there is no rule against such changes. 4 Mr. Justice Douglas was quite
accurate when he wrote that such overruling does not bring about an
abrupt change in the law; it rather recognizes a fait accompli. It is true,
of course, that one of the parties before the court has only just before
argued the contrary. There is a loser in every litigation, and this is so
even if it is statutory language that is at issue. We may certainly agree
that there is change in the law. There must be if it is not to be more
conservative (anti-democratic) than even Professor Tedeschi presents it.3"
26. Id. at 82.

27. Douglas, note 8 spra.
28. Jones v. South-West Lancashire Coal Owners Ass'n, [1927] A.C. 827, 830.
29. The attorney general's fiat permitting appeal to the House of Lords was
granted in only 23 cases from 1907 to 1960. Williams, The Administration of Justice
Act 196o, [1961] CRm. L. Rxv. (Eng.) 87.
30. Rex v. Taylor, [1950] 2 K.B. 368.

31. Winter, Divisional Court Precedents, 9 MODERN L. REv. 257 (1946) ; 9 HALsOF ENGLAND 448, n. h (Simonds ed. 1952).

BURY'S LAW

32. British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500.
33. Nkambule v. The King, [1950] A.C. 379, 397.

34. In areas like taxation it may be conceded that stare decisis is next to useless.
See Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, [1960] SUPREmE CT. REv. 222.
35. Though it is true that Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) changed
the rule laid down in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), as Professor Tedeschi
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In French practice it is true that judges are prohibited from pronouncing general rules when they have cases before them, 6 but we see
also that an elaborate apparatus has been established to assist the Court
of Cassation to maintain uniformity of its decisions. The central index
of decisions created in 1947 has grown into an organization manned by
a score of persons of magisterial rank." In addition, the first president
of the court may call into being an assemblee pleni~re composed of at least
fifteen of the senior members of the court when he feels it is necessary
in order to avoid contrariety of decisions. It is appropriate that a court
charged with securing the uniformity of the law should concern itself
with keeping its precedents in order.
Professor Tedeschi discusses the various methods for the study and
preparation of legislative codes and the multitude of problems and viewpoints that become involved when one tries to work out a national law in
an area in which many diverse historical influences have had their play.
The chapter on the relation of the religious and the secular in a state
that does not proclaim secularism probes fundamental questions of great
interest.
There is a danger that a reader with presuppositions about a legal
system that differs greatly from those of his author will misread the
author's text. This reviewer has taken care to avoid that danger, but
if he has in fact succeeded, much of that success must be credited to Professor Tedeschi's understanding of the kind of law with which this reviewer is familiar. Professor Tedeschi is stimulating; the need exists
for an English edition of his Studies in Private Law.
GERALD

L. KoCKt

EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSoCIATES-"SQUEEZEOUTS" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES. By F. Hodge O'Neal and Jordan Der-

win. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
247. $10.00.

1961. Pp. vii,

This comprehensive study on the causes of and remedies against oppression or elimination of partners or stockholders in small business
indicates in his note 55 on page 133, this reviewer does not agree with Professor Tedeschi's statement of the new rule. For accurate discussion of the Williams case, supra, see
Guild, Stranger Attack on Sister-State Decrees of Divorce, 24 U. CHi. L. REv. 376

(1957).
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37. See Article 19, Decree 58-1281, December 22, 1958.
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